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Abstract 
This paper focuses on how to promote electricity regional cooperation. We begin by discussing the 
theory of international trade cooperation in electricity, with a view to discussing what preconditions 
might be important in facilitating wide area trading across national borders.  
We then develop lessons based on the comparison of four case studies. These include three regional 
developing country power pools – the Southern African Power pool (SAPP), West African Power pool 
(WAPP) and the Central American Power Market (MER). We contrast these with Northern Europe’s 
Nord Pool. These cases highlight both the potential and difficulty of having cross-jurisdictional power 
pools.  
In the light of the theory and evidence we present, we draw key lessons for other regions – such as 
the South Asia Region (SAR) – in the areas of: preconditions for trading; necessary institutional 
arrangements; practicalities of timetabling; reasons to be hopeful about future prospects. 
JEL Classifications: F13, L94. 
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1. Introduction 
The problem of how to promote wide-area trade in electricity is a well-known one within individual 
countries. National electricity markets in advanced countries developed over time as initially local, 
vertically integrated distribution companies found that there were substantial cost and quality of 
service advantages to horizontal integration and interconnection between service territories. While 
some countries developed near monopoly generation utilities which made use of a national 
transmission system (e.g. France), other countries did develop (limited, but in some cases 
substantial) trading between continuing regionally vertically integrated utilities (e.g. Japan and the 
United States). The creation of a national or wide area electricity transmission system which is 
centrally dispatched has been key to the promotion of trade in electricity2. Such a system physically 
allows energy from different power stations to be directed towards supplying given electrical loads 
from a common ‘power pool’. 
Clearly physical interconnection is necessary, because without it no electricity can flow across pre-
existing electrical boundaries. Traditionally countries have been very reluctant to trade electricity 
across borders and hence have limited the construction of cross-border transmission lines. This is 
actually unusual in energy. For 2012, globally exports of electricity are around 3% of total 
production, in contrast to c.52% for oil (and Natural Gas Liquids), c.31% for gas and c.17% for coal 
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(with the average for all goods and services being c.31%)3, suggesting that there may be substantial 
scope for increased trade in electricity across the world. 
This paper will focus on the institutional arrangements for facilitating electricity cooperation. We 
begin by discussing the theory of international trade cooperation in electricity, with a view to 
discussing what preconditions might be important in facilitating wide area trading across national 
borders. Next we will introduce four case studies. Arguably, the most successful international power 
market in the world is Nord Pool (which includes Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark). We 
compare this with three regional developing country power pools – the Southern African Power pool 
(SAPP), West African Power pool (WAPP) and the Central American Power Market (MER). We then 
go on to draw key general lessons on the promotion of electricity trade across borders based on the 
theory and experience for other regions such as the South Asia Region (SAR) – namely Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
 
2. The theory of cooperation and international trade applied to electricity 
 
In thinking about the institutional arrangements that might facilitate increased cross border trade in 
electricity, it is useful to think about ideal electricity market design and institutions. Hogan (1995) 
suggests that a wholesale pool spot market and an independent system operator (ISO) should go 
together. This is because short term generator dispatch and short term transmission system 
operation are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Hogan, 1995, p.26). This suggests that power trading 
should be associated with an institution which is also responsible for the operation of the 
transmission system in real time. Hogan (1998) suggests that nodal pricing of the transmission 
system access is also desirable unless the networks are relatively simple. Thus the US Standard 
Market Design - which incorporates these ideas - may be the most sophisticated market design for 
wide area trading, but it may not be necessary for international trade in electricity.  
Other designs may work, but the institutional design of markets is undoubtedly important. Stoft 
(1996) correctly predicted (prior to the California electricity crisis of 2001) that the institutional 
conflict between the California ISO and the California Power Exchange might decrease system 
reliability and lead to inefficient dispatch! Efficient market design is also about the participation of 
the demand side in the wholesale electricity market. This is increasing in importance in many of the 
most sophisticated markets, such as PJM and New York (see Walawalkar et al., 2010). For many 
countries demand side response inside their own country might be much cheaper at the margin than 
expanding international imports of power. 
A key point about market design is the need for sufficient transmission capacity. Fursch et al. (2013), 
in their examination of the European Union (EU), suggest that cost optimal trading within the EU 
would require 76% more transmission capacity. It is important to note that transmission capacity is 
not just required at the border to facilitate cross border trading. Loop flows in the electricity system 
mean that the ability to export/import electricity across one transmission link is dependent on the 
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absence of congestion on other transmission lines, which may be internal to one or other country. 
Without sufficient transmission capacity cross border trade is going to be limited. 
The degree of sophistication in markets may be limited when moving to cross border markets. 
Brunekreeft et al. (2005) note that locational marginal prices (LMPs) as recommended by Hogan and 
practiced in the PJM area of the eastern US may be desirable in the EU, but they are unlikely to be 
politically viable. This may explain why the EU has promoted market coupling between national 
markets and allow some merchant interconnection, rather than LMPs. Perez-Arriaga and Olmos 
(2005) suggest that the problem that LMPs try to solve in the US with 200+ control areas is much less 
in the EU with 17 to 27 control areas. Clearly having congestion constraints (and their associated 
prices) imposed internationally is difficult to sell to national politicians. 
International trade is always mutually beneficial under the assumption of costless adjustment of 
factors of production (and the other assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international 
trade). However this assumption of costless adjustment is not clearly satisfied when it comes to the 
sectors affected by electricity trading. While one might assume that factors of production in the 
electricity sector can be moved to other sectors (the capital, labour and materials employed in fossil 
fuel based power production are reasonably fungible), it is not so obvious for electricity intensive 
industries. These industries, such as mining, glass, chemicals, may be dependent on cheap domestic 
power. If increased power exports leads to rising domestic electricity prices, this may undermine 
their comparative advantage, necessitating wider (costly) factor allocation adjustment within the 
economy. 
International trade in electricity may however alter the risk profile around electricity prices. This is a 
version of the ‘energy security’ problem.  In theory if two countries begin trading electricity this will 
normally provide some insurance against large shocks to electricity prices. This will be the case 
where their domestic supply/demand risks are either independent or negatively correlated. 
However clearly there will be some imported price volatility and the possibility of a large 
supply/demand shock in one country inducing a large price effect in the other country, which it 
could have avoided under a no-trade (autarky) in electricity situation. 
Over time, there is the possibility that dependence on imports of electricity might develop and 
domestic production facilities might close.  This could expose an importing country to a hold up 
problem if the other country refuses to export. However, in reality these would seem to be second 
order (and manageable) risks associated with increased trade dependence. It is worth pointing out 
that such energy security risk is two – sided, as the exporting country might become equally 
dependent on the export revenue from electricity sales.4 
Trade theory has become increasingly concerned with considering departures from the assumptions 
of the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model. Markusen (1981) showed that if markets were initially 
monopolised a large country opening up to trade might suffer a loss of welfare due to the 
competition from another monopolist in the other country in a two country trade model. However 
Lahiri and Ono (1996) show that this result does not hold if new firms enter. Trade liberalisation 
becomes beneficial again. The general result of Dixit and Norman (1986) emphasises that trade can 
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always be made beneficial as long as consumption and income taxes can be used to compensate 
losers within an economy.  
An important question in international trade theory is whether trade worsens the natural 
environment. This might be a concern for electricity trading where exploiting low cost resources 
might involve burning more coal in a low generation cost country. Antweiller et al. (2001) find that 
trade is generally good for the environment. This is because trade effects can be divided into three: 
an increased scale of activity; a composition effect on industrial structure; and an effect in improving 
technology. For a sample of sites in 43 countries over the period 1971-96, they find the scale effect 
worsens pollution by 0.25-0.5% for each 1% increase in GDP due to trade, the structure effect is 
neutral and the technology effect reduces pollution by 1.25-1.5%. This gives an overall positive effect 
on the environment due to trade. If wide area trading makes emissions control and the spread of 
low emissions technology more likely, then it is likely to be good for the global environment. In 
electricity, these positive environmental effects are highly likely as trading often allows the 
exploitation of low cost renewable resources (e.g. hydro power in Norway) or the sharing of nuclear 
power (e.g. from France). 
It is also important to be clear that electricity trade is not always beneficial where international 
trading is imposed on top of inefficient national arrangements. De Villemeur and Pineau (2012) 
model the integration of electricity markets in two jurisdictions, one selling at average cost, the 
other with a competitive market and prove that the overall welfare result is worse than under no 
interconnection. According to the theory of the second best we would expect that the price setting 
mechanism in each of the connecting national markets would need to be similar for trade not to 
worsen the initial distortions in the markets. Clearly if one jurisdiction was selling electricity at below 
cost and another at its true (higher) cost the result of the joining of the two markets would worsen 
the impact of the initial price distortion in the jurisdiction with prices below cost. This is likely to be a 
particular problem in some regions with a history of energy subsidies. 
International power pools are a fairly typical example of the opening up to trade of a previously non-
traded commodity. The initial situation in many developing countries is that there are monopoly 
electricity suppliers in each country each charging below cost in order to stimulate electricity 
intensive economic activity. If trade were to raise prices in one country but not in another that 
would affect the distribution of electricity intensive industry between the two countries. Of course 
this effect is tempered by the fact that commercial and industrial electricity consumers value the 
reliability of electricity supply as well as its price (Oseni and Pollitt, 2013) and hence if trade were to 
improve supply reliability and increase price at the same time in a particular country then it is 
possible that more electricity dependent industry would be attracted to that country. 
As noted above, distributional effects are important in considering whether to open up to trade. This 
is particularly true for electricity. First, low electricity price jurisdictions worry that electricity trading 
will raise prices for final consumers, while increasing the profitability of electricity producers. If 
ownership of electricity production is concentrated while electricity consumption varies less than 
proportionally with income then electricity trading with higher price regions may be blocked (as is 
the case in some states of the US (by states with cheap coal) and between France (low price) and the 
UK (high price)). Similarly in jurisdictions with cheap electricity for large electricity intensive 
industries, there may be a reluctance to export electricity at the expense of the trade dislocation 
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caused by a potential reduction in electricity intensive manufacturing exports (e.g. Norway). Finon 
and Romano (2009) suggest that this could be dealt with by a windfall tax on hydro and nuclear 
producers (in the context of European countries), which could then be distributed to domestic 
consumers if necessary. These effects explain why high price jurisdictions are naturally keener on 
electricity trading with lower price jurisdictions than the other way round (see Joskow, 1997, on the 
United States). 
As discussed above, electricity trading is likely to cause a redistribution of factors of production 
within countries. Energy intensive companies and industries (and their workers) in exporting 
countries are likely to object to an expansion of exports which leds to higher domestic electricity 
prices. Examples of energy intensive companies in South Africa (part of SAPP) which might object to 
power export led price increase are AECI, Harmony Gold Mine Company, Kumba Iron Ore Ltd, Consol 
Glass (pty) Ltd, Glencore, among others. These energy intensive firms account for 44% of South 
African’s total electricity use and contribute about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. There is evidence 
that South Africa’s Energy Intensive User’s Group (EIUG) – an association of high energy consuming 
firms – disagreed with the 16% a year tariff increase proposed by Eskom in its five year multi-year 
price determination (MYPD3) covering period from April 2013 to 2018.5 An example of heavy 
electricity user in the West African Power Pool (WAPP) is gold mining industry in Ghana. Mining 
activities contribute more than 6% and 40% to the country’s GDP and export earning respectively, 
and the country’s four major gold mining companies (Goldfields, Anglo Gold Ashanti, Golden Star 
and Newmont) account for 13% of the country’s electricity use (Würtenberger and Hassan, 2011). 
This suggests that an export-led increase in electricity price in the country may lead to substantial 
economic restructuring (e.g., downsizing) and can possibly generate a protest. In the Central 
American Power Market (MER), chemical and metal industries in Guatemala are examples of heavy 
electricity users which might oppose a cross-border trade led price increase. It is interesting to note 
that opposition to electricity exports is not limited to developing countries. There is also evidence 
that trade union within Norwegian energy intensive industry were opposed to renewable electricity 
exports (Gullberg, 2013). Such internal opposition to increased exports is likely to be one of the 
reasons for the low level of global exports of electricity. 
Neary (2007) predicts that trade liberalisation in a particular sector will also lead to low cost firms in 
the country with comparative advantage in a sector taking over the similar high cost firms in the 
other country. This is likely to raise welfare in aggregate, but it raises profitability for producers in 
the low cost country at the expense of consumers generally. Neary predicts merger waves resulting 
from trade liberalisation (subject to capital market liberalisation). Indeed this is clearly what has 
been seen in the electricity sector in Europe as a result of successive efforts on the part of the EU to 
create a ‘single electricity market’ (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). This may not be a problem for the 
distribution of welfare internationally, as long as domestic shareholders can realise the benefit of 
the merger at the time of asset sale, however if there is capital market inefficiency this may not be 
the case. 
International trading of wholesale power is more valuable when the price of power fluctuates 
seasonally or across the day at individual locations due to weather fluctuations (Bahar and Sauvage, 
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2013). This means that trade will occur between countries even where their average pre-trade prices 
are the same. The rise of renewable energy in some countries adjacent to each other makes such 
trade more valuable.  However it does put pressure on the physical characteristics of the system. 
Electricity is not a typical arbitraged product, because it has several dimensions of quality including 
voltage and frequency, in addition to energy (power). What is needed is a market operation regime 
which adequately accounts for the need to maintain power quality in the face of energy price 
fluctuations. A good example of how important this is was the incident which occurred on 4th 
November 2006 when a problem in Northern Germany (a ship hitting a power line) caused blackouts 
in southern Europe (and other places)6. Market integration meant that one of the German system 
operators created a power quality externality, which the Spanish grid operator failed to manage 
successfully. 
Where there are multiple countries seeking to reach an international trading arrangement there may 
be additional negotiation issues. One of the parties may block the agreement in an attempt to 
increase its share of the benefits. If it does so excessively or in a way that may set a precedent for 
other international agreements between the parties this may lead to the agreement not being 
reached. There are obvious ways to handle this, such as using Shapley values which look at the value 
to the coalition of an additional member7. However there is a real problem where side payments 
between regions must be made. If these are politically difficult to enforce then this may prevent 
agreement.  
Gately (1974) looks at the benefits from electricity cooperation between three Indian regions – Tamil 
Nadu, Andra Pradesh, Kerela-Mysore (KM). He finds that there are substantial benefits to all three 
regions cooperating in terms of reduced operation costs of their three power systems. However KM 
always has higher costs in any bilaterial or trilateral agreement. The rise in KM’s costs are substantial 
(x3) as it exports its cheap hydro to other states, but costs in aggregate fall by 20%. Gatley shows 
that the order of joining the agreement may influence the value which an individual party can 
extract from agreement. He also notes that states may not just value the reduction in costs, but also 
care about the loss of jobs in the electricity sector as in state costs fall. The question for market 
arrangements put in place is therefore whether the market allows individual nations to capture a fair 
share – both in the national and overall sense – of the benefits to the cooperation. This may be a 
particular problem where a transit state which hosts a transmission line does not actually import or 
export much electricity from it. Compensating this state fairly for its participating in the international 
agreement may be subject to these sorts of issues. 
Coordination of adjacent electricity systems under a single system operator could bring significant 
benefits in terms of congestion management. Kunz and Zerralin (2013) analyse congestion costs 
within Germany under the current regime of 4 separate transmission system operators (TSOs) versus 
a single German TSO. For a model calibrated to 2011, they find congestion costs of €30.36 m under 
full coordination versus €179.56 m under the current approach. They conclude that having four TSOs 
will become increasingly expensive relative to having a single TSO as the amount of intermittent 
generation increases. 
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Kogut (1988) makes a general point about joint ventures which is relevant to power markets. He 
notes that the pooling of resources in a joint venture (in this case a regional power market, where 
the participants are countries and their firms) may not be just about transaction cost savings or 
strategic advantages. It may be about the benefits of tacit knowledge transfer. Agreeing to 
participate in a wide area power pool is a good way to learn about other markets and to benchmark 
against best practice for any individual firm, beyond a simple cost benefit comparison against the 
current national arrangements. 
Amundsen and Bergman (2007) discuss how prices across the Nord Pool area seem to be well 
integrated and vary according to underlying resource constraints. A particularly successful test of the 
Nord Pool system occurred in 2002-03 when a significant shortage of hydro capacity in Norway led 
to a severe price spike. Amundsen and Bergman (2006) note how the market coped well with this 
supply shock, maintaining political support. They suggest that the stakeholders involved understood 
that allowing market clearing prices to be high encouraged long term investment and that 
associated financial markets (which allowed hedging) also helped. This highlights how any 
international power pool needs to be able to withstand the inevitable stress tests that will come. In 
particular there needs to be confidence in the price determination process and a willingness to 
understand that a supply shock in one country will need to be supported by higher wholesale prices 
in connected markets. Thus temporarily high prices are an important price signal and represent a 
payment for mutual insurance. 
The perception of the fairness of the regional market may be very important in extending 
international trade in electricity. Dickson and Kalipurakal (1994) suggest that the idea that 
competitive market determined electricity prices are always ‘fair’ is only one of several potential 
concepts of fairness in market transactions. Specifically, the idea that if there is scarcity, scarcity 
prices should be charged to everyone may be one that is difficult to accept (or to explain to a 
national electorate). Interestingly, Dickson and Kalipurakal find that the market traders in the US 
that they survey are generally happy with market determined prices (rather than the alternative of 
Dual Entitlement where prices go up if costs go up and do not go down if costs go down). This may 
not be true of electricity consumers (or their elected representatives) in general. CEER (2012, p.46) 
note that retail end user price controls continue in 16 out of 27 EU countries in spite of legislation 
aimed at creating a single electricity market with fully market determined wholesale and retail 
prices. 
When it comes to the benefits of wide area markets there is a lot of concern about the exercise of 
market power, particularly if competition policy enforcement is weaker internationally than it is 
domestically. In the European Union, which has pan-European competition policy and enforcement, 
this is not a big issue. However in other regions, such as SAR, if the market design gave rise to the 
exercise of market power this would be an issue. Market monitoring within wide area markets is an 
important activity to ensure that the market is behaving as intended.8 
Von der Fehr and Harbord (1998) look at different types of markets which may deviate from the 
perfectly competitive outcome: capacity constrained markets with Bertrand competition; collusive 
oligopolies in repeated games; supply function equilibria; and auction approaches. Clearly there is a 
worry about gaming, especially between countries within regions. Changing the nature of 
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competition, by extending the market, may change the current behaviour of players within existing 
markets.  Similarly, Neuhoff and Newbery (2005) discuss how the move to integrated markets could 
initially lead to higher prices until enough competition emerges to definitely lower prices.9 
There is a question of whether existing independent power producers (IPPs) will individually 
participate in a power market or form a coalition (or merge) to get a higher price. Jia and Yokoyama, 
(2003) use Shapley values to investigate whether an IPP would be better off participating individually 
in a power market or via a coalition. Ferrero et al. (1997) however show theoretically that if power 
pools are big enough selling into them at marginal cost (and participating in a ‘grand coalition’) may 
be better than deviating and not participating in the power market. This modelling suggests that if 
the international power pool is big enough the gains for an individual country from participating may 
become bigger than refusing to participate (the EU Single Electricity Market project, may be a good 
example of this). 
Market power is not necessarily limited to incumbent generators in an international power market. 
National system operators may also exercise market power. System operators manage congestion 
on their networks and the transmission constraints behind them represent significant barriers to 
electricity trading (Kumar et al., 2005), as mentioned above. However they are under national 
incentive schemes to minimise internal congestion within their control areas. Under international 
trading they may have incentives to shift transmission constraints to international interconnectors to 
reduce constraints within their own country, reducing the benefits of international competition. The 
Swedish transmission system operator was recently subject to anti-trust action by the European 
Commission for doing this within Nord Pool.10 
While power markets are good for short term competition and efficiency there is an issue with 
whether they induce optimal long term planning. Kagiannas et al. (2004), note that generation 
expansion planning is evaluated differently if done by several competing firms (or countries), than if 
done by one monopoly firm. They note that the scope for mistakes to be made in aggregate may be 
increased by increasing the number of firms in the market. 
Hobbs et al. (2005) estimates the benefits of Netherlands - Belgium market coupling to the Belgian 
market using a transmission-constrained Cournot model. The study projects social surplus 
improvements on the order of 200m €/year, assuming market coupling does not encourage the 
largest producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to the Cournot 
strategy due to a perceived diminished threat of regulatory intervention. However benefits would be 
higher if transmission capacity was increased to allow the competitive baseline to be achieved. 
In the context of the EU the impact of reducing market power, through more effective competition, 
is potentially very significant. Lise et al. (2006) show that for a simulation of 8 EU countries in 2000 
moving from a situation of strategic competition to perfect competition would reduce profits 
substantially. In their analysis the profits of EdF and Electrabel (the incumbent generators in France 
and Belgium) would fall by one third. This implies the importance of having enough transmission 
capacity to promote competition and of the monitoring of the competitive behaviour of market 
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players. In the case of developing countries, international trade requires adequate transmission 
capacity and mutually beneficial pricing arrangements, even if neither are fully optimal. 
 
3. Case studies of cross jurisdictional electricity trading 
 
In what follows we contrast three developing country power pools (Southern African Power Pool –
SAPP; West African Power Pool – WAPP; and the Central American Power Market - MER) against 
Nord Pool. The developing country power pools are chosen because they represent serious 
international attempts to allow groups of countries to benefit from potentially beneficial trade. Nord 
Pool represents a global benchmark for international trading and has been used with the EU as an 
exemplar of how to create a single electricity market. 
In Table 1 we outline the development history and the institutional features of each. We compare 
what happened to facilitate trade; the nature of the trading platform; what institutions were set up 
to support it; the governance of these institutions; the practical steps to implementation; and the 
concrete evidence on the benefits of trade. The case studies are not all successful and some took 
many years (more than might be thought necessary) to reach fruition. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Table 2 we report some statistics which illustrate the extent of the cross border trading associated 
with each of our case study power pools in 2012. Year 2012 represents a typical year because 
trading performance of the pools this year does not vary significantly from those of other years (see 
Appendix 1). The table shows the proportion of cross-border electricity trades to interconnector 
capacity (transmission capacity) and total electricity consumption in some selected countries across 
various Power Pools. Data on annual electricity consumption and trade were converted from kWh to 
MW for them to be in the same units as interconnector capacity.  Conversion was done by dividing 
the annual data on each variable in kWh by 1000*24*365. The results as reported in the table 
indicate that a lot more trade takes place in Nord Pool and in SAPP than in the other power pools.  
For instance, while the interconnection capacity utilisation are respectively 39% and 50% for Nord 
Pool and SAPP, WAPP and MER record just approximately 9% and 4% respectively. Similarly, the 
proportions of cross-border trade to consumption are 28% and 21% for Nord Pool and SAPP 
respectively, whereas in WAPP and MER trade is only 5% and 2% of their consumption. It is worth 
noticing that while SAPP appeared to have utilised its transmission capacity (50%) more than the 
Nord Pool (39%), Nord Pool has traded more of its consumption (28%) than the SAPP (21%). This is 
likely to be because transmission capacity is less optimally sized in SAPP than in Nord Pool 
preventing the sort of profitable peak trading that is possible in heavily interconnected markets. 
The performance of SAPP does stand out relative to other developing countries’ power pools. The 
reason for SAPP’s success might be because of the (excess) existing generation capacity in South 
Africa which makes trading possible. Unlike the WAPP whose installed capacity stood at only 
9,705MW as at the time it was formally created, Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) installed 
capacity at inception in 1995 was 48,461 MW, with about 38,000 MW in South Africa alone. 
Similarly, SAPP was created many years before other pools in developing countries - e.g. WAPP was 
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established in 2000/2001. Those extra years of existence were used to develop the power pool –by 
developing and upgrading international transmission links - in order to promote trading within the 
pool.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Key policy lessons from the case studies 
 
This section highlights the lessons learned from the various trading arrangements discussed in this 
paper. We organise these under a number of key headings. 
 
Pre-conditions for international electricity trade 
 
Both expanded bilateral power trading and more formal power pools require a broader pre-
commitment to free trade to be successful. 
Electricity is just one commodity that could be freely traded across borders. It is not clear that it can 
be traded easily without a prior commitment to the creation of a free trade area. The existence of a 
regional trade agreement can aid regional electricity trading in several ways: the existence of a 
regional trade regime reduces/removes possible trade barriers to regional power market and 
reduces planning time as most of the rules and regulations necessary for regional trading would 
have been established. However there is still a need for specific trade agreements to support 
electricity trade. This is partly because WTO rules do not adequately address trade in electricity, 
because it combines goods (production) and services (transmission), and involves other policy 
objectives to do with the environment and energy security.11 
Free trade arrangements between countries lead to the establishment of the trust required to 
promote the development of a regional power pool. SAPP, WAP and MER are clearly being 
promoted within a wider trade development context. Thus, SAPP is an offshoot of the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) while WAPP is a subsidiary of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS).  The existence of regional trade might be the reason why bilateral 
power trades can thrive even before an advanced power pool is achieved. 
Our case studies are consistent with the hypothesis that greater trade openness leads to more cross-
border trade in electricity, even keeping the potential gains from trade constant. 
The existence of a common currency is not a pre-condition for an effective functioning electricity 
market. Although a common monetary unit does help facilitate trade because it signals deep trade 
integration, this is not necessary and fully functioning cross border electricity markets can exist in 
the presence of multiple currencies (as is the case in all four of our case studies). 
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Similarly, it should be pointed out that institutions of competition policy enforcement across a free 
trade area are not necessary for power pools to develop and function effectively (they don’t exist for 
the SAPP or MER countries). However, such institutions are a sign of deep trade integration – such as 
in the EU – and do act as regulators of mergers and market power in cross jurisdictional power pools 
(such as across Nord Pool). 
It almost goes without saying that for trade to occur, there must be a price differential between the 
potential parties to the trade. This implies that there must be a relatively low electricity price 
country, where the unit value of electricity exports to the relatively high price country is greater than 
the willingness to pay for a unit electricity consumption within the low price country. In many 
countries of WAPP this is not the case, in the sense that the price an importing country (e.g. Ghana) 
would be willing to pay for a kWh is less than the willingness to pay of demand for a kWh within the 
potential exporting country (e.g. Nigeria). In theory this country should be exporting only after 
satisfying its latent domestic demand. This fact may explain the slowness of the development of 
international interconnection from countries with favourable export potential. 
Adequate transmission capacity is essential for power trading to occur.  Thus, agreements for 
expanding transmission capacity are integral to the development of an international power pool. 
A generalised commitment to free trade is not enough to promote the development of a fully 
functioning cross-jurisdictional power pool, with a single market price. The development of WAPP 
beyond bilateral trading has been prevented by a lack of transmission capacity. Lack of transmission 
capacity has not prevented the emergence of spot markets in MER or SAPP but has severely limited 
their significance and explains the prolonged dominance of bilateral trading. By contrast in 
developed regional power pools such as Nord Pool there has been a significant amount of 
transmission capacity which has supported the development and operation of more effective power 
pools. While our case studies suggest power markets can come before the development of 
interconnection (e.g. in the case of MER), they can only be significant in the presence of sufficient 
interconnection.  
However ‘cross border’ investments in transmission capacity did occur to a limited extent historically 
where there were sufficiently large bilateral gains relative to the cost of transmission expansion (i.e. 
large price differentials which can be arbitraged by relatively short distance wires). This explains the 
existence of some transmission capacity between jurisdictions within all of our case studies, prior to 
the formation of the power pools we discussed. The expansion of this initial transmission capacity - 
to the extent that it has occurred – has been supported by feasibility studies which have attracted 
multilateral agency finance. MER, WAPP, SAPP have all been financed by international development 
agencies (IADB, World Bank and AfDB). 
Good Institutional Arrangements 
The role of strong, efficient and independent institutions in ensuring an effective functioning 
integrated power market cannot be over-emphasised. 
An integrated power pool needs an efficient operator who can oversee and sanction the activities of 
market participants in order to prevent predatory pricing, non-disclosure of capacity, and other 
forms of unruly behaviour. Cross-border institutional arrangements are essential, but can take a 
13 
 
variety of forms. WAPP and SAPP are international arrangements for electricity exchanges which lack 
overarching regulation, and SAPP has been successful. While the strength of the institutional 
arrangements governing cross-border trading is undoubtedly limited if it is cross border, it clearly is 
possible to build strong cross-border power markets (as recently demonstrated by MER).  
Getting the appropriate combination of regulation and market design for power pools is important. 
While a new cross border regulatory agency is not necessary, some regulatory oversight is beneficial. 
SAPP could have benefited from some regulation of Eskom’s potentially predatory pricing behaviour. 
Nord Pool and MER are subject to some form of external regulatory oversight. Cross-border 
electricity markets within the EU are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Commission, which 
regulates EU wide competition. Market design may be important for reducing the need for cross-
border regulatory enforcement action. For instance, price based (rather than cost based) bidding 
might involve large distributional transfers and potentially significant welfare losses. The price 
determination process should both be based on underlying economic cost and take account of the 
potential for market power and the existing pricing inefficiencies within the trade partners. Clearly 
disputes about price determination are potentially more difficult to resolve in a cross-border market 
than in a national market and hence should be avoided.  
Countries may have rational reasons to wish to mitigate the price risks associated with electricity 
market integration. Small countries faced with increasing their exposure to foreign sources of 
electricity price volatility may be unwilling to have much exposure to short term international 
market prices and prefer most trades to occur under long term contracts at fixed prices. This may 
explain the lack of trading in the short term day-ahead market (DAM) of SAPP and the preference for 
bilateral contracting in both SAPP and MER. Clearly as long as the price determination process for 
long term contracts is reasonably efficient then this may not be a problem and the market 
participants should decide the mix of contract terms under which electricity is exchanged. 
The use of day-ahead markets and/or real time markets facilitates more trade and greater market 
efficiency. 
Day-Ahead/real time trading leads to more competition than in bilateral arrangements and 
therefore results in more efficient utilisation of resources. The bidding mechanism in day ahead/real 
time market tends to make suppliers more efficient in order to keep their marginal costs as low as 
possible since they can be bid out of trade/market if they bid too high price. A day ahead/real time 
market is more flexible and does more to facilitate trade than bilateral arrangements alone. This 
seems to be in line with the experience of MER (where most trade is bilateral) vs Nord Pool (where 
there are effective real time markets). Efficient short term prices should act to guide the more 
efficient determination of long-term contract prices. 
How to ensure timely development 
There can and should be a timetable for reform and development. 
Developing and keeping to a timetable are essential for the rapid development of an integrated 
power market. It is necessary that agreeing parties design a timetable with clear objectives and 
details of the procedures or processes required. This would allow them to keep track of their 
progress as well as having a definite focus. In each of our jurisdictions a timeline of development can 
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be identified. The setting of a clear timetable, for each stage of market development, seems to have 
been instrumental in the development of Nord Pool. 
There can be an important role for international organisations to facilitate the creation of power 
pools. 
The creation of a regional power pool requires substantial investments in building and updating 
generation capacity, transmission networks, and human development. All four of the international 
power markets we look at have received significant external development support and financing 
(e.g. from the AfDB, IADB and the EU). The support levels are significant (50+% of the funding for the 
SIEPAC project within the MER came from the IADB)12. Thus, the evidence is that the sustained 
support of international organisations or foreign capital (as bilateral aid or development finance) is 
required.  
In SAPP there is a significant gap between bids for electricity to be traded and actual traded volumes 
in DAM (only around 25% of bids were actually traded in September 2013)13. This gap is due to 
transmission constraints. Similarly, the slow development of trading in the WAPP was partly caused 
by lack of adequate funding required to embark on massive infrastructural developments necessary 
for effective trading arrangements, although they do receive foreign support. WAPP might have 
developed more quickly if an international organisation had fully taken charge of the creation and 
development of the WAPP for a possible hand-over to the member countries at a later date. 
Clearly sovereign countries may be reluctant to cede control of the project to an international 
agency, but the fact is that the MER countries have been willing to do this. 
The viability (or otherwise) of an international power pool should be assessed in advance by a careful 
cost-benefit analysis.  
Clearly any major policy change should be subject to an impact assessment. This is particularly true 
of electricity markets which lend themselves to modelling. This assessment can provide a 
quantification of likely benefits and identify the need for any side payments to countries who 
facilitate trade but do not directly benefit (this was a particular issue in the SIEPAC case). Also, fuel 
costs may be reflected more quickly in power prices in an international power market, than in a 
managed national market. This can expose wholesale electricity price dependent customers to 
significant variability in prices. Modelling would expose whether such volatility is likely to be higher 
or lower with an integrated market. 
Power pools can (and should) start with a small number of countries and grow over time. 
The EU experience also suggests that regional power markets – involving just 2 or 3 parties- might be 
a good place to start on the road to full market integration. Nord Pool became an international 
power market by expanding from Norway to include Sweden in 1996 (it now covers trades between 
9 countries). Indeed, the most integrated markets are those that have grown organically rather than 
                                                          
12
 See http://www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2013-06-25/energy-integration-in-central-
america,10494.html Accessed 15 July 2015. 




those that deliberately started with a large number of jurisdictions. The slow growth of WAPP may 
be a function of the large number of participating countries – 14 - at the beginning. Starting small 
means that large gains from trading can be demonstrated and that new parties willingly opt in to an 
existing working arrangement. This would seem to offer more chance of steady deep progress, 
rather than prolonged initial development periods and thin trading.  
Reasons to be hopeful about the prospects for international power trading in other regions, such as 
SAR 
Trust building around electricity trading is possible even between countries with a history of conflict.  
Our three developing country case studies are drawn from troubled regions. The nature of the 
trouble was not necessarily at the border but sometimes internal conflict (with SAPP and MER). This 
did represent a potential source of supply risk for international partners. However in the case of 
SAPP there have been actual cross-border conflicts in the past. Often electricity trading - by 
reinforcing mutual interdependence - can be a significant positive outcome for the conflict 
resolution process.14 
The potential gains within the South Asian Region (SAR) from cross-border electricity trade are large. 
ESMAP (2008) discusses the nature of the gains from increased energy trading in the South Asia 
Region (SAR). The SAR countries are part of a free trade area – SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area, 
formed in 2006) – and currently have very little cross-border trade in electricity but exhibit 
significant potential for beneficial trade. This report discusses the bilateral (and multilateral) 
electricity trades that might be mutually beneficial within the region. Of these, six are relevant to our 
initial list of eight SAR countries: Pakistan-India and Pakistan-Afghanistan; Bhutan-India; Nepal-India; 
Bangladesh-India; India-Sri Lanka; and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India multilateral trade. 
The ESMAP report discusses the absence of electricity interconnection between Pakistan and India 
and the difficulties of interconnecting Pakistan with Afghanistan, suggesting that the gains from 
trade are modest. Bhutan-India is the one electricity trade success story in the region, with Bhutan 
deriving significant government revenue from the export of hydro based electricity to India. In 2010 
Bhutan exported 5.4 TWh (or 75% of its production) to India.  Nepal-India has the biggest 
unexploited trade potential. Nepal has 43 GW of identified economic hydro capacity, and an 
installed capacity of just 721 MW in 201015. Much of any hydro capacity could be exported to India, 
but Nepal net imports of 0.8 TWh (with production of just 3.6 TWh) in 201216. Bangladesh-India 
electricity trade is also at a very low level in spite of good prospects for the export of gas based 
generation from Bangladesh to India (0 TWh of reported exports, out of production of 49 TWh in 
2012)17. In spite of considerable under-utilised hydro resources in Sri Lanka and a mere 30 km of sea 
to India, there remains no interconnection between the two countries. 
                                                          
14
 We discuss positive electricity developments on the island of Ireland and in South East Europe in Oseni and 
Pollitt (2014). 
15
 Source of recent electricity production, import and export figures: CIA The World Factbook. Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
16
 IEA Electricity Information 2014, p.III.6. 
17
 IEA Electricity Information 2014, p.III.6. 
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In terms of a regional electricity market, there would seem to be a lot of potential for a joint 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India market, aimed at exploiting the considerable hydro potential of 
Bhutan and Nepal. Studies carried out by USAID under its SARI-E program18 identified relative low 
cost transmission investments ($9m to $52m at the time) which would significantly increase cross 
border transmission capacity in the north east border region of India and its three neighbours. 
Chattopadhyay (2013) quantitatively examines the high benefit to cost ratios across three potential 
cross border links within the SAR: India-Sri Lanka, India-Bhutan and India-Nepal. The major sources 
of benefit are avoiding unserved energy, operational cost benefits and capacity benefits, when 
measured using an investment planning and optimisation model. These benefits are $1.8bn p.a., 
against one-off transmission line costs of $700m. Chattopadhyay does not discuss the distributional 
impacts and why the links are not already built if they are really so beneficial.  
Clearly if such large potential gains from electricity trade exist it would be worth understanding what 
barriers stand in the way of electricity trade across regions, such as the SAR, and how they can be 
overcome. However the lessons from our four case studies offer clear guidance on developing the 
right pre-conditions, setting up appropriate institutional arrangements and how to organise the 
process of building a successful international power pool. 
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Table 1: A Comparison of Nord Pool, SAPP, WAPP and MER 
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Table 2: Share (%) of Trade in Electricity Consumption and Transmission Capacity in Selected Countries by Pool 



















































Nord Pool         
Norway 5395 30180 14703.2 1,974 390 2,363 43.8 16.1 
Sweden 11825 36510 15353.9 1,679 1,455 3,135 26.5 20.4 
Finland 3310 16680 9960.0 381 1,839 2,220 67.1 22.3 
Denmark 6405 13710 3915.5 1,297 1,463 2,760 43.1 70.5 
Estonia 1941 2751 877.4 264 156 420 21.6 47.9 
Latvia 2084 2166 778.8 242 530 772 37.1 99.2 
Lithuania 2714 3820 1097.3 754 645 1,399 51.5 127.5 
Total 33674 105817 46686.1 6,591 6,479 13,070 38.8 28.0 
West African Power Pool (WAPP) 
Ghana 627 1985 650.9 28.4 49.7 78.1 12.5 12.0 
Nigeria 855 5900 2192.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Senegal 100 638 158.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 327 1222 368.8 88.1 0.0 88.1 27.0 23.9 
Total 1909 9745 3370.7 116.6 49.7 166.2 8.7 4.9 
Central American Power Market (MER)      
Guatemala 300 2745 812.2 15.1 0.9 16.0 5.3 2.0 
El Salvador 300 1491 533.8 0.8 4.3 5.1 1.7 1.0 
Honduras 300 1701 536.1 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.3 
Nicaragua 300 1108 293.3 0.0 7.3 7.3 2.4 2.5 
Costa Rica 300 2800 920.5 8.8 23.2 32.0 10.7 3.5 
Panama 300 1976 590.2 14.3 1.0 15.3 5.1 2.6 
Total 1800 11821 3686.1 38.9 38.1 77.0 4.3 2.1 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
DRC 260 2437 684.6 218.7 0.7 219.4 84.4 32.0 
Zambia 1400 1679 1008.9 30.6 25.3 55.9 4.0 5.5 
Mozambique 5800 2428 1159.8 1,349.3 945.0 2,294.3 39.6 197.8 
Botswana 1450 132 302.3 0.0 249.0 249.0 17.2 82.4 
South Africa 2050 44260 24554.8 1,616.4 1,206.6 2,823.1 137.7 11.5 
Lesotho 230 76 35.1 0.0 28.2 28.2 12.3 80.5 
Namibia 750 508 415.0 10.4 287.6 298.0 39.7 71.8 
Total 11940 51520 28160.4 3,225.5 2,742.4 5,967.8 50.0 21.2 
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Appendix 1: Annual shares of Trade in Electricity Consumption by Power Pool (based on Table 2)  
 
Figure A1 shows the share (%) of trade (imports + exports) in electricity consumption from 2000 to 
2012. The Figure shows less variation in the proportion of cross-border trade in consumption for 
most of the years. The exceptions are WAPP and MER whose shares of trade in consumption shrunk 
considerably between 2000 and 2008 and between 2005 and 2009, respectively. The reason for this 
might be connected with the inability of member countries to satisfy their rising domestic energy 
demand which posted serious challenges to cross-border exchanges. For instance, Nigeria recorded 
some electricity exports between 2000 and 2004 but became a non-exporting country afterwards. 
Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire’s electricity exports fell by approximately 54% between 2006 and 2010. The 
period between 2005 and 2009 experienced drops in exports by all the MER countries, reflecting the 
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